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TRUSTS
By

HENRY

S. BARNES*

The significant developments in the law of trusts during the year have
been in the field of legislation. The i95o session of the Legislature passed
three bills: Act 5421 to exempt certain trust property from intangible taxes;
Act 5432 to exempt the income derived from the same class of property
from income taxes; and Act 7283 to prevent a trust from becoming executed
so long as the trustee has active duties to perform.
Act 542' exempted from intangible taxes "intangible personal property
belonging to any trust exempt from Federal income taxes under Section

i65 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code."
Act 543 amended Georgia Code Section 92-3io5 by adding at the end
thereof a new subsection, (k), which reads as follows: "(k) Trusts exempt from Federal income taxes under Section i65 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code."
Since other states have passed similar acts relieving pension and profit
sharing trusts from the burdens of income and intangible taxes, it is believed that Acts 542 and 543 will enable Georgia to compete with them
on an equal basis for the pension and profit-sharing trust business.
Act 728 provides: "A trust shall be executory, and the legal estate shall
remain in the trustee, whether or not the beneficiary or beneficiaries be sui
juris and whether or not any remainder interest be created, so long as the
trustee has any powers or duties in regard to the trust property such as to
preserve or protect, to manage, to invest or reinvest, to collect income or
proceeds, to sell or otherwise dispose of, to ascertain the objects or the
beneficiaries, or to distribute income or principal."
Before the passage of Act 728, trusts could be created for the benefit of
minors, persons non compos mentis and spendthrifts.' However, such a
trust became executed as soon as the grounds for the trust ceased, and
legal title automatically vested in the beneficiary. Any person interested
could bring a proper proceeding in the superior court where the trustee
resided to have the trust annulled. This meant that such a trust would be
destroyed, without regard to whether or not the trustee had active duties
to perform, as soon as the minor reached his majority, the person non
compos mentis regained his sanity or the spendthrift reformed. It is
evident that in many instances the interests of the beneficiary, from the
viewpoint of the settlor, were not protected. Since the basis of the continuity of such a trust, under the old law, was the status or condition of
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the beneficiary, it followed that such a trust did not have that degree of
permanency required for the adequate protection of the beneficiary. This
fact became apparent when the case of the reformed spendthrift or the
case of the person of unsound mind who had temporarily recovered was
considered.
The act changes the basis of continuity of such a trust from the condition or the status of the beneficiary to the duties that the settlor has imposed on the trustee. So long as the trustee has active duties to perform,
he retains legal title to the trust res and the trust remains executory. The
intention of the settlor that the beneficiary shall continue to enjoy the income of the trust after his disability has been removed is given effect without the necessity of providing a contingent limitation over.
Before the act, a valid trust might be created for the benefit of a person
sui juris, provided a situation was created in which it was legally necessary
that legal title remain in the trustee in order to carry out the intention of
the settlor as to that portion of the dispositive scheme which in and of itself did not offend the public policy that trusts should become executed as
soon as possible.
Several illustrative cases will now be mentioned. A valid trust can be
created for a person sui juris for life with a remainder in trust for a minor.
Such a trust embraces both estates and the trustee is empowered to act
for both the life tenant and the remainderman.' A valid executory trust
can be created in favor of a person sui juris where there are contingent
remainders or executory devises limited in favor of others A person might
create out of his own property a valid trust estate for himself for life, provided the instrument also contains a valid remainder in trust.' However,
a legal remainder is not sufficient to prevent the trust from becoming executed.'
The above decisions are also illustrative of the public policy that is set
forth in the Code ° that every person who is capable of handling his own
property ought to be permitted to do so unless such property is the subject
matter of a limitation over in favor of some person for whose benefit a
valid trust may be created or where it is necessary that the trustee hold
legal title for some purpose other than the mere management of the estate.
Does Act 728 establish a departure from a long established policy in this field and formulate a new one that is more in line with the development of trust law in other states? That seems to be the case.
Since the act does not purport to amend or repeal the code sections involved in the manner specified by the Constitution,11 serious questions as to
the scope and validity of the act may arise. If it was the legislative intent
that the act cover the entire subject-matter of the code sections involved,
then it may follow that they were entirely repealed by implication. Such
a holding will result in the destruction of the special classes of trusts that
6. Sides v. Shewmaker, 188 Ga. 672, 4 S.E. 2d 829 (1939).
7. Sanders v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 450, 6 S.E. 2d 294 (1939) ; McBride v. Bullard, 188 Ga. 354, 4 S.E. 2d 149 (1939).
8. Clark v. Baker, 186 Ga. 65, 196 S.E. 750 (1938).
9. DeVaughn v. Hays, 140 Ga. 208, 78 S.E. 844 (1912).
10. GA. CODE §§ 108-111, 108-112 (1933).
11. GA. CONST. Art. III, § 16, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1916 (1948 Rev.).
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were based on the status or the condition of the beneficiary and substitute
therefor a type of trust unaffected by the character of the beneficiary. If
the legislative intent was merely to repeal the provisions of the code sections which executed trusts set up thereunder, such trusts may be created
as heretofore and their power to continue will be based on the duties imposed on the trustee rather than the status or condition of the beneficiary.
It is believed that fewer problems would have been raised had the act
merely amended the code sections involved, if such was the legislative intent. The evident purpose of the act was to remove certain peculiarities
from the trust law of Georgia and thereby to make it conform more nearly
to that of other states. Whether the purpose has been accomplished or not
cannot be determined until the appellate courts have spoken.
There has been no unusual development in the case law of trusts
within the year, but satisfactory progress has been made in defining, illustrating and clarifying established principles.
A Totten trust is valid in Georgia.12 In Guest '. Stone1" the difference
between a Totten and a testamentary trust is pointed out. In the former
there is an intent to create a present trust, subject to total or partial revocation by withdrawal of the deposit in the lifetime of the depositor-settlor;
whereas in the latter the intent is to create a trust to become effective on the
death of the depositor-settlor. In the former the intent may be proved by
parol, in the latter it must be proved by an instrument executed with all the
formalities of a will.
Hancock v. Hancock" discusses the differences between express and implied trusts and distinguishes between the two classes of implied trustsresulting and constructive. The decision serves to clarify the concepts of
resulting and constructive trusts and facilitates the application of long
recognized principles to new factual situations. In Price v. Price" the
characteristics of the resulting trust that arise when one person pays the
purchase price of a piece of land, title to which is taken in the name of
another, is discussed. Particular attention is paid to the principle that an
oral promise by the grantee to hold in trust for another will not prevent
or defeat a resulting trust where the law would, in the absence of such an
agreement, imply a trust. The resulting trust arises out of the presumed
intent of the person who pays the purchase price whereas the express trust
comes into being by contract and the law requires this contract to be in
writing. Clements v. Hollingsworth" should be studied in connection with
Hancock v. Hancock and Price v. Price in order to get a clear picture of the
distinction between the resulting and the constructive trust. Estes v. Estes"
treats the problem where two parties jointly take title to a piece of land
and one of the parties furnishes more than his share of the purchase price
as a question of fact as to the extent of the resulting trust in favor of the
payor.
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Mercks points out that loyalty of an agent to his principal is

a primary obligation which, if- violated by the agent in that he acquires an
interest in the property antagonistic to his principal, constitutes him a trustee of the interest acquired for the benefit of his principal.
Chatfield v. Dennington9 reiterates the ancient principle that when
property is given for a particular charitable purpose the trustee cannot
devote the goods to another purpose not within the scope of the original trust. In this connection it should be noted that this is not a case
for the application of the doctrine of cy pres. There was no general intent
to devote the goods to charity but merely an intent to devote them to
furthering a particular purpose and if the particular purpose failed to have
the corpus return to the settlor or his heir.
18. 206 Ga. 361, 57 S.E. 2d 326 (1950).
19. 206 Ga. 762.58 S.E. 2d 842 (1950).

